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Abstract 
Rate-pegging has been in place in NSW for more than thirty years with broad support 
from all sides of politics. However, in late 2008 the NSW Government commissioned 
IPART to report on the adequacy of rate-pegging. IPART produced a Draft Report and 
then a Final Report, which has not yet been released by the NSW Government. 
Nevertheless, the NSW Government has made some changes to local government finance 
by way of capping developer charges, allowing IPART to make annual rate-pegging 
determinations, and enabling IPART to consider special variations in rate-pegging. 
Against this background, this paper considers the principles and practice of rate-pegging 
in NSW, the rationale for rate-pegging and counter-arguments on its desirability, as well 
as its economic effects on NSW local government finance relative to other Australian 
local government jurisdictions. 
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1. Introduction 
New South Wales (NSW) is alone amongst Australian states in employing a policy of 
rate-pegging designed to limit increases in property taxes that can be levied by local 
councils in that state.1 In essence, the term ‘rate-pegging’ refers to the imposition of state 
government determined upper annual bounds on the annual rate of increase in property 
taxes levied by municipalities. This policy has been an ongoing source of bitter 
controversy in NSW itself and the cause of much bemusement in the broader 
Australasian local government community (Dollery, Crase and Johnson 2006). While 
NSW had employed a form of rate-pegging between 1901 and 1952, which was 
discontinued due to its ‘impracticality’ (NSW Local Government and Shires Association 
2008:16), the genesis of the modern method of rate-pegging may be found in the 1976 
state election campaign, where rapid increase in rates had become the subject of political 
controversy. Under the Local Government (Rating) Further Amendment Bill, an interim 
type system of rate-pegging was re-introduced by the victorious Wran Labor 
Government in 1977 and further refined into its contemporary form in 1978. The timing 
of the introduction of rate-pegging legislation into the NSW Parliament should be seen 
against the historical backdrop of economic developments in NSW in the 1970s; over the 
period 1973 to 1976, rates had increased on average by 188 per cent, largely as a 
consequence of increased local government expenditure, whereas average weekly 
earnings over the same period rose by 75 per cent and the rate of inflation was 56 per 
cent (Johnson 2001:5).2 
 
While the mechanics of the rate-pegging process have been adjusted periodically, the 
basic principle has remained unchanged to the present day. However, on 27 October 
2008, (then) NSW Premier Nathan Rees announced to the annual New South Wales 
Local Government Association conference that the NSW government had given serious 
thought to removing rate pegging. This followed an earlier instruction to the NSW 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) in May 2008 to investigate the 
operation of rate-pegging and report on its findings. In July 2009, IPART released a draft 
Review of the Revenue Framework for Local Government. This Draft Report proposed 
two alternative approaches for a revised system: Option A would retain rate-pegging for 
                                                        
1  An exception resides in the fact that the Northern Territory joined NSW in imposing rate-pegging for a 
transitional three-year period beginning 2008 while extensive structural reform was put in place 
(Productivity Commission, 2008, p.97).  
2  Increases in rates in other Australian local government jurisdictions over the same period were 
substantially lower than in NSW (Radbone and Robins, 1980).  
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all councils, but link it to a new local government cost index and establish a ‘medium 
term’ cap on rates to allow for some revenue certainty. Option B would add to Option A: 
under Option B councils which demonstrated sound financial performance (as measured 
in accounting terms) would be exempted from rate-pegging altogether for periods up to 
four years.  
 
After a period of public submissions on the Draft Report, IPART handed a Final Report 
of Review of the Revenue Framework for Local Government to the NSW Government in 
December 2009. As at July 2010, the NSW Government had still not released the Final 
Report to the public, nor had it responded formally to the Final Report of the Review of 
the Revenue Framework for Local Government. However, as part of the 2010/11 NSW 
budgetary process, the NSW Premier Kristina Kenneally announced ‘sweeping changes 
to local government charges on new housing development’ which involved some 
modification in the manner in which rate-pegging would be applied in NSW local 
government in future (Keneally 2010). As part of its $44 million Comprehensive 
Housing Supply Strategy, aimed at securing ‘additional land releases, lower levies and 
faster planning decisions’, the NSW Government set out the following measures: (a) A 
‘hard cap’ of $20,000 per lot for council developer charges, known as Section 94 
contributions in NSW, imposed on new developments, and (b) a constraint on council 
Section 94 charges to be limited to ‘essential infrastructure’ which was ‘necessary for the 
development to happen’, like road works and stormwater management.  Since (a) and (b) 
would inevitably intensify financial distress in local government, the NSW Government 
recognised that they would place upward pressure on rate-peg variation claims from local 
authorities. As a consequence, it retained rate-pegging, but it modified the process of 
rate-pegging. In the first place, the NSW Government transferred the determination of 
the rate-peg to IPART, which would devise a new Local Government Cost Index to 
employ in setting the annual rate-peg.  Secondly, IPART was also placed in charge of 
deciding ‘special rate variation requests’ by councils, as well as ‘variations for essential 
and community infrastructure’.  
 
These requests, through which councils sought permission to levy rate above the rate-
peg, had hitherto been considered by the Minister for Local Government directly. No 
further detail has been forthcoming from the NSW Government on the mechanics of the 
new process and it remains to be seen how it will work in practice.  
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Without getting involved in the minutiae of the two IPART recommendations, which 
have yet to be accepted or rejected, or the proposed new method of IPART implementing 
the rate-pegging process, it thus seems an opportune time to consider the nature of rate-
pegging, the arguments surrounding its desirability, and its economic effects on NSW 
local government. This forms the main aim of the present paper.  
 
The need for a satisfactory and stable rate-setting regime in NSW local government has 
been heightened by the Local Government Amendment (Planning and Reporting) Act 
2009, which introduced an Integrated Planning and Reporting (IPR) framework. From 
the financial year 2010/11 onwards, the IPR framework will oblige local councils to 
prepare a long-term (minimum 10-year) Community Strategic Plan, a 4-year Delivery 
Program to implement that plan, plus annual Operational Plans and Annual Reports. The 
planning time horizon for local government has thus been substantially extended and 
consequently councils will require greater certainty on future rate increases. This makes 
debate on the current system of setting rates in NSW especially relevant. 
 
The remainder of this paper is divided into five main parts. Section 2 provides a synoptic 
description of the principles and practice of rate-pegging. Section 3 considers the 
rationale for rate-pegging and various arguments on this question. Section 4 seeks to 
evaluate the impact of rate-pegging on trends in rates in NSW relative to other Australian 
state local government jurisdictions. Section 5 provides a synoptic description of various 
suggestions which have been proposed for improving the rate-setting system in NSW, 
including those contained in the IPART Draft Report. The paper ends with some brief 
concluding remarks in section 6. 2.  
 
2.  Principles and Practice of NSW Rate-Pegging  
In terms of the Local Government Act 1993, NSW local authorities have six main 
sources of revenue: rates, charges, fees, grants, borrowings, and investments. With 
respect to income from property, under Section 493 of the Local Government Act 1993 
local councils calculate and distribute rates among four defined categories of rateable 
properties in their respective local jurisdictions; farmland, residential, mining and 
business. Section 492 of the Act makes provision for two types of rates: ordinary rates 
and special rates. Section 494 of the Act stipulates that every council must strike and 
 DOLLERY & WIJEWEERA: Rate-pegging in New South Wales
 
 
CJLG July 2010  60
 
levy an ordinary rate each year on all rateable land within its jurisdiction. By contrast, a 
local council can exercise discretion on whether or not to levy a special rate under 
Section 495 of the Act. Special rates are aimed at the finance of particular projects, such 
as specified local infrastructure, but must be applied to all ratepayers if the project will 
benefit the entire local government area (Department of Local Government 2007). 
 
For each category of property, rates can be calculated in one of three ways: Entirely on 
the land value of the property (calculated as an amount per dollar of unimproved land 
value); on a combination of the land value of the property and a fixed amount per 
property; and entirely on the land value, but subject to a minimum amount. Land values 
are set by the Valuer General at the Department of Lands under the Valuation of Land 
Act 1916 every four years (Department of Local Government, 2007). 
 
Part 2 of Chapter 15 of the Local Government Act 1993 allows the relevant Minister to 
impose limits inter alia on a council’s ‘general income’.3 With respect to the mechanics 
of rate-pegging, the NSW government sets a ceiling on the total amount of income that 
each council can raise from its rates and charges on land. This limit is termed the ‘rate-
peg percentage’ and it is prescribed prior to each fiscal year by the Minister for Local 
Government. As a consequence of rate pegging, a given council’s overall rates revenue 
cannot increase by more than the percentage increase approved by the Minister. Indeed, 
even if land values in a local government area rise in aggregate, local councils may have 
to reduce or otherwise adjust the amounts levied per dollar so that total revenue does not 
increase by more than the percentage increase stipulated by the Minister (Department of 
Local Government 2007).  
 
In terms of the Local Government Act 1993, ‘general income’ does not include various 
rates and charges, including rates on water supply and sewerage, annual charges for 
waste management and storm water management services.  Other sources of revenue are 
                                                        
3  In addition to rate-pegging, other budgetary and legislative constraints affect the ability of local 
councils to set rates in NSW.  These also operate in other Australian local government jurisdictions.  
They include the land and property valuation methods stipulated by state governments, constraints on the 
ability of local authorities to impose differential rates on different categories of ratepayer, exemptions 
made for various classes of ratepayers (sometimes offset by reciprocal tax arrangements), and 
concessions that must be applied to certain categories of ratepayer (sometimes offset by reimbursements).   
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also not covered under ‘general income’, such as user charges, interest, grants, developer 
contributions, donations, and other forms of revenue, like fines and business activities.  
As we have seen, councils can apply to the Minister for Local Government for 
permission to increase their general income by more than the rate-peg limit, a process 
which has now been transferred to IPART. This is called a special variation application. 
Guidelines for such applications have thus far been issued each year by the Department 
of Local Government, and councils applied for a special variation for one year only or 
for several years. A council had to include details of its intention to apply for a special 
variation in its draft management (corporate) plan and consider any submissions received 
from the public. If approved, the Minister specified the percentage by which the council 
could increase its general income, as well as the period of time over which rates may 
exceed the rate-peg. Whether the new IPART process follows this path remains to be 
seen. 
 
To date, the process of rate-pegging has involved an annual limit on rate increases, 
typically set in March each year. In principle, ‘this percentage reflects the projected 
annual increase in costs that a typical council delivering services at levels comparable to 
the previous year is likely to incur this year’ (IPART 2008:48). Following this 
announcement, individual councils submitted requests for a special variation to the 
Minister for Local Government, who made a final determination on each submission by 
June. This enabled local councils to strike their rates to take effect by 1 July of each 
financial year.  
 
Given the proposition that the rate-peg percentage is supposed to reflect the ‘projected 
annual increase in costs’ faced by councils, it is interesting to compare the rate-peg with 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the past ten years. Figure 1 compares the annual 
rate peg with the CPI over the fiscal years 1998/99 to 2008/09: 
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Figure 1: Annual Rate Peg Percentage and Change in CPI, 1998/99 to 2008/09 
NSW: Annual rate peg percentage and change in the CPI, 
1998/99 to 2008/09
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Source: Amended Table 7.1 (IPART, 2008, p.48). 
The information contained in Table 1 indicates that, in general, the rate cap exceeded the 
change in the CPI over the previous financial year; this is true for all years, except 
2002/03 and 2007/08. It should be noted that the CPI for 2001/02 contained in the 
2002/03 column in Table 1 reflects the impact of the introduction of the new  
 
General Sales Tax (GST) on goods and services of 10 percent by the federal government, 
making it an unusual year. A second feature of the data contained in Table 1 is that, by 
way of a general trend, the rate cap and the CPI track each other closely. Finally, it 
should be stressed that the CPI is a measure of the rate of increase of a given basket of 
goods and services, weighted to reflect Australian consumption patterns, rather than a 
measure of production costs. It is thus not a good measure of the rate of increase in the 
costs faced by councils.  
 
3. Rationale for Rate-Pegging 
Rate-pegging represents a sub-set of a larger category of public sector regulation dealing 
with state-imposed limitations on the expenditure and taxation by local government, 
including property taxation (see, for example, Temple 1996 for a synoptic review of this 
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literature). This kind of regulation has given birth to a theoretical and empirical literature 
which has an overwhelming American institutional bias. State-wide limitations on local 
taxes, fees and charges, including property taxes, are comparatively common in the 
United States and often put to electorates in the form of referenda (see, for instance, 
Figlio and O’Sullivan 2001). However, little is known about either the effects of explicit 
tax and expenditure constraints on local government or the determinants of voter support 
for fiscal limitations. In common with earlier work, Temple (1996) found evidence 
which suggested that state-wide limits on property taxes induced a relatively larger 
reduction in local services than local administration. By contrast, Vigdor (2004) has 
argued that tax limitations have succeeded because they allowed voters to lower tax rates 
in communities other than their own where they hold property, invest or work, but have 
no vote. Unfortunately, this American literature has little bearing on rate-pegging in 
NSW since there is no provision for referenda on local taxes. Moreover, the significant 
differences between Australian and American local government, not least the much 
narrower range of functions in Australian local government, render most of this literature 
irrelevant to the NSW case.  
 
The economic rationale for rate-pegging derives from the normative prescriptions of 
standard economic theory: local government enjoys a monopoly in the provision of 
essential local services. Accordingly, like all other monopoly providers, it will provide 
these services at excessive prices and/or inefficiently and thus warrants regulation by 
higher tiers of government to ensure efficient and equitable outcomes (Bailey 1999). 
However, it is important to immediately add the caveat that regulation must be carefully 
applied since bad regulation can make matters worse than no regulation at all (Hillman 
2005). The validity of this general proposition is recognised in the NSW debate over 
rate-pegging (see, for example, NSW Treasury 2008).  
 
With respect to economic efficiency, optimal regulation should seek to secure allocative 
efficiency, where the mix of local services provided must coincide with local community 
preferences, and productive efficiency, where local services must be produced in the 
most cost effective manner. In addition, regulation should also try to ensure that equity 
objectives are met. For example, essential local services should be provided to poor 
households by local councils at affordable prices. The effective application of regulation 
is difficult in all spheres of economic activity, including the operation of the local 
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government sector (Bos 1994). Moreover, regulation is further complicated in the local 
government sphere due to the fact that local councils possess the legal authority to tax; a 
monopoly power missing in both the private sector and in most other public utilities. 
Finally, in the special case of local council revenue regulation through rate-pegging, the 
regulatory agency faces additional problems since it is not regulating the prices of 
particular local services but rather the ‘tax-price’ of a whole genre of local public goods 
and services that are mostly unpriced. 
 
Against this background, IPART (2008:55) has summarised the arguments surrounding 
rate-pegging that have been employed in the NSW debate. In terms of the case for rate-
pegging, four separate arguments are identified:  
 
a) Revenue regulation through rate-pegging prevents the abuse of monopoly power 
in the provision of basic local services;  
b) Rate-pegging assists in controlling ‘cross-subsidisation’ and imposes restrictions 
on the ‘provision of non-core services and infrastructure that might prove 
unsustainable to ratepayers’; 
c) Rate-pegging manages the risk of poor governance in the local government 
sector; and 
d) Rate-pegging limits the ability of councils to divert funds from essential 
infrastructure to other projects as well as expenditure on ‘marginal services’ that 
are better provided by the private sector. 
 
Some of these arguments are less than convincing. For example, it is not at all obvious 
that rate-pegging can have any positive influence on the supply of local services under 
argument (a); indeed it seems more likely to curtail their supply by restricting funding. 
Similarly, in terms of (b), it hard to appreciate why rate-pegging will dampen cross-
subsidisation. Quite the opposite may occur if fees and charges are increased to 
counteract the impact of rate-pegging. Along analogous lines, argument (b) does not 
meet with empirical reality regarding ‘non-core’ local services. For instance, Dollery, 
Wallis and Allan (2006) have demonstrated that an ongoing shift in all Australian local 
government jurisdictions has taken place away from ‘services to property’ towards 
‘services to people’, including NSW. Much the same objection can be levelled against 
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argument (d). The NSW Treasury (2008:13-14) also found all four arguments largely 
unconvincing. 
 
An additional argument for rate-pegging is adduced later in Revenue Framework for 
Local Government: Issues Paper (IPART2008:63). This contends that local government 
accountability is improved through rate-pegging because ‘the process of assessing and 
making determinations on applications for special variation’ ensures that the 
‘reasonableness of all applications is scrutinised’ which may ‘enhance councils’ 
accountability’. But this argument is partly undermined by that fact that only a small 
proportion of NSW councils – only 26 councils out of 155 local authorities in 2008/09 
(IPART 2008:56, Table 7.3) – actually applied for special variation; a point taken up 
later in this paper. 
 
Two further implied arguments for rate-pegging were put forward in the Independent 
Inquiry into the Financial Sustainability of NSW Local Government (Allan et al 2006). 
Firstly, rate-pegging had worked well, compared with other Australian local government 
jurisdictions, if its primary aim was to constrain rises in council rates; an observation 
supported by both the Productivity Commission (2008) and the NSW Local Government 
and Shires Association (2008), which we will examine more closely in this paper. 
Secondly, rate-pegging may have forced NSW local government to become more 
efficient than it would otherwise have been, especially in the domain of corporate 
overheads and administrative costs (Allan et al 2006:245-257). 
 
An alternative public choice argument for rate-pegging has been advanced by Dollery, 
Crase and Byrnes (2006). Invoking Wittman’s (1995) model of democratic efficiency, 
they asserted that the pervasive nature of the phenomenon of ‘local government failure’ 
in Australian local government meant that electors had demanded state government 
oversight of local councils, especially in pecuniary affairs. Thus, in Australian states, 
‘“watchdog” institutions will form an agency relationship with local government voters 
to demystify fiscal illusion by monitoring council revenue and expenditure decisions on 
behalf of voters (Dollery, Crase and Byrnes 2006:350). In NSW, this ‘watchdog’ role has 
occurred inter alia in the form of rate-pegging, which has enjoyed strong public support 
(see IRIS Research 2005).  
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IPART (2008:55) identified four separate arguments employed in the debate against the 
use of rate-pegging: 
a) Rate-pegging limits councils’ ability to provide local services; 
b) Rate-pegging prevented infrastructure backlogs from being addressed; 
c) Rate-pegging led councils to impose higher user pays charges which could result 
in pricing inequities; and  
d) Rate-pegging contradicts the principles of democracy and accountability of local 
government.  
 
Most of these arguments seem to carry weight. In particular, argument (c) appears 
especially convincing. In this regard, the NSW Treasury (2008: 14) has noted that 
‘constraints on general revenue distort revenue raising sources and result in higher user 
charges’. Argument (a) also seems valid. After all, if the net effect of rate-pegging has 
indeed been to constrain total council income, then it follows that it must have limited 
local services as well. Argument (d) rests on normative grounds rather than on economic 
observation; it would appear obvious that regulation of rate-setting must diminish local 
democratic autonomy since it arbitrarily limits local decision making. 
 
However, argument (b) does not meet available empirical evidence. For instance, the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006) National Financial Sustainability Study of Local 
Government found that not only was a large number of local councils in all Australian 
local government jurisdictions financially unsustainable in the long run, but that most 
councils confronted a massive local infrastructure backlog, regardless of the rate-setting 
regime in each state. Moreover, Byrnes, Dollery, Crase and Simmons (2008), Dollery, 
Byrnes and Crase (2007), and others, have demonstrated that the magnitude of this 
backlog is so substantial that it is now beyond the present capacity of any Australian 
local government system to remedy without outside financial intervention. Since this 
problem is endemic to all Australian jurisdictions, and does not appear to be 
comparatively more acute in NSW, it would thus seem that the NSW local infrastructure 
backlog cannot be ascribed simply to rate-pegging. The abolition of rate-pegging in 
NSW cannot therefore be expected address this problem. 
 
The Local Government and Shires Associations of NSW (2008) developed a further and 
more general argument against rate-pegging couched in political economy terms. One 
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aspect of this argument is that rate-pegging has an unintended and broader ‘dampening’ 
effect on rates than simply the pegged limit. In this vein, the Association (2008: 14) 
contended that ‘one likely explanation for the dampening effect is that rate-pegging 
provides a public framework and creates public expectations about maximum rate 
increases, placing political pressure on councils to stay within the limit and not seek 
special variations’. A second dimension of this general argument is that rate-pegging 
provides a useful mechanism for local councils in NSW to engage in politically 
expedient ‘blame shifting’ onto the state government. The Association (2008: 15) argued 
that rate-pegging ‘provides an easy default option from both a political and managerial 
perspective’ since (a) all rate increases can be attributed to the state government; (b) the 
need for community consultation to justify rate rises diminishes; (c) sticking to the rate-
peg limit avoids the problems contingent on special variation applications; (d) ‘councils 
can blame the state government for their financial deficiencies’; and (e) the existence of 
rate-pegging enables councils to avoid long-term planning. The net result of these factors 
has been the ‘under-provision of community infrastructure and services’, the emergence 
of a local infrastructure backlog and ‘undermining’ the financial sustainability of 
councils.  
 
4. Impact of Rate-Pegging 
The impact of rate-pegging on the NSW local government sector is best assessed not in 
isolation, but rather in comparison with the experience of local government systems in 
other Australian state jurisdictions which do not have any regulatory ceiling imposed on 
rate increases. In other words, the unique use of rate-pegging in NSW allows analysts to 
treat it as a kind of ‘natural experiment’ in Australian local government. A comparative 
exercise of this kind faces several difficulties, quite apart from the ubiquitous problem of 
data comparability. The most important of these difficulties in the present context are 
twofold:  
  
First, there are substantial differences in relative significance of different sources of 
revenue in the different states (Worthington and Dollery 2001; 2002). For example, 
IPART (2008: 25) observed that ‘there tends to be an inverse relationship between 
taxation revenue and revenue obtained from the sale of goods and services’. Thus ‘states 
with greater reliance on taxation revenue (South Australia (57.9 per cent), Victoria (47.2 
per cent), and Western Australia (43.5 per cent)) collected less revenue from the sale of 
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goods and services, whereas states with less reliance on taxation revenue (Tasmania 
(32.2 per cent) and Queensland (26.0 per cent)) obtained greater revenue from the sale of 
goods and services’. By contrast, the NSW local government sector ‘is close to average, 
with a relatively even split in terms of its reliance on either revenue source’. However, in 
the present context, this problem is ameliorated by the fact that we are not concerned 
with absolute differences in the level of rates between NSW and other state local 
government jurisdictions, but rather in the rates of change in property tax revenue 
through time. 
 
Second, considerable variation exists in the functions of local government in the different 
jurisdictions (Worthington and Dollery 2001 2002), which affect both expenditure and 
revenue patterns. For instance, in Queensland, Tasmania and non-metropolitan NSW 
(outside of the greater Newcastle-Sydney-Wollongong conurbation served by Sydney 
Water and Hunter Water), councils provide sewerage and water supply services, which 
earn an income, in contrast to the other state local government jurisdictions. In addition, 
there is an ongoing shift in local government functions away from ‘services to property’ 
towards ‘services to people’ (Dollery, Wallis and Allan 2006), which further distorts 
comparison; unless it is heroically assumed that this shift has occurred in a uniform 
manner across all states. However, because we are chiefly concerned with trends through 
time in rate rises, both of these problems become less acute.  
 
These variations are compounded by the fact that large disparities in the capacities of 
individual local councils to raise rate revenues also exist within given state jurisdictions, 
as vividly illustrated in the Productivity Commission’s (2008) Assessing Local 
Government Revenue Raising Capacity, especially Table 3.1 in this Report. While these 
disparities are in part attributable to the socio-economic characteristics of different local 
government areas, particularly local disposable incomes and their impact on the ability of 
householders to pay rates, numerous other influences are obviously at play, notably 
‘differences between urban, rural and remote councils, in population, rating base and the 
ability or willingness of councils to levy user charges’ (DOTARS 2007: 12). 
 
With these caveats in mind, we now seek to determine the impact of rate-pegging in 
NSW local government in the larger Australian local government context. Figure 2 
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illustrates trends in local government rate revenue per capita by state and territory 
jurisdiction over the period 1998/99 to 2005/06, expressed in constant 1998/99 dollars. 
 
Figure 2: Local Government Rate Revenue per Capita, 1998/99 to 2005/06 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DOTARS, 2007, p. 15. 
 
A glance at Figure 2 demonstrates that the average per capita rate revenue funding gap 
between NSW and the other Australian jurisdictions has grown over the seven-year 
period in question. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that NSW also has ‘the lowest council 
rates per capita of any jurisdiction in Australia other than the Northern Territory’ (Allan 
et al 2006: 207).  Similar insightful data have been assembled by Allan et al (2006: 207, 
Table 9.4), reproduced here in Table 1 (which reinforce the information in Figure 2).  
Table 1: Total Percentage Rate Increases by Jurisdiction, 1995/96 to 2003/04 
 
State or territory Per cent increase 
NSW 29.2% 
ACT 35.2% 
Tasmania 36.3% 
South Australia 55.1% 
Queensland 55.6% 
Western Australia 64.8% 
Victoria 66.1% 
Gross domestic product 61.8% 
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It is evident from Table 2 that the percentage increase in rates was substantially lower in 
NSW than in the other states; indeed, it amounted to less than half of the rate rises 
experienced in Western Australia and Victoria. From this and other data, Allan et al 
(2006: 2007) concluded that ‘rate-pegging has been a constraint on [NSW] councils’ 
revenue-raising capacity causing it to fall behind other states, notwithstanding NSW’s 
relatively strong property market over this period compared with Australia as a whole’. 
The Productivity Commission (2008: xxxiii-xxxiv) drew very similar conclusions from 
its deliberations. After stressing that ‘the rate of growth in rates revenue in NSW has 
been among the lowest of all jurisdictions over the past seven years’, it noted that NSW 
‘also has rate revenue per person below that of most other jurisdictions’. It thus found 
that ‘rate-pegging in NSW appears to have been restricting revenue raised from rates, 
notwithstanding scope for councils to seek variations to mandated rate increases’. The 
Local Government and Shires Associations of NSW (2008: 14) reached an analogous 
conclusion: ‘If the objective of rate-pegging was simply to constrain council rate 
revenues, rate-pegging has been a success’ since ‘NSW rate revenue growth is lagging 
other jurisdictions’.  
 
In addition, as we have seen, the Associations (2008:14) contended that rate-pegging had 
several other unintended effects. They asserted that rate-pegging has reduced investment 
in infrastructure maintenance and renewal – an argument which does not appear to 
accord with the evidence garnered by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2006). A much more 
important argument in the present context resides in their claim that the special variation 
option is under-utilised, which suggests that the rate-pegging system has had a more 
general ‘dampening’ effect than the stipulated rate peg itself.  
 
This proposition is worth considering in more detail. Table 2 provides information on the 
number of special variation applications submitted over the past seven years and the 
number of these applications that were approved by the Minister. 
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Table 2: Total Special Variation Applications Submitted and Approved, 2002/03 to 
2008/09 
 
 
 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10
Rate peg 
percentage 
 
3.3 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.4 3.5 2.6 
Number of 
applications 
for special 
variation 
received 
30 23 25 42 46 34 30 28 
Number of 
applications 
for special 
variation 
approved 
23 23 22 30 39 30 18 N/A 
Total 
number of 
Councils 
172 172 152 152 152 152 152 152 
 
Source: IPART (2008: 56); Allan et al (2006: 50): pers. comm. Mark Hely, Principal Finance 
Officer, NSW Division of Local Government, Premier’s Department, 17.06.10 
 
The information contained in Table 2 seems to vindicate the observations made by the 
NSW Local Government and Shires Association (2008), considered earlier in this paper, 
regarding the broader ‘dampening’ effects of rate-pegging. Thus in the 2008/09 special 
variation round, only 26 councils applied - a mere 17 per cent of all councils – of which 
24 were successful. Put differently, while only a small proportion of councils actually 
apply under the special variation system, a very high faction of these applications prove 
successful, ranging from a low of 71 per cent in the 2005/06 round to a high of 100 per 
cent in 2003/04. In other words, even though the great majority of special variation 
applications are approved by the Minister, comparatively few local authorities apply; a 
fact which thus must be ascribed to factors other than the prospects of success of an 
application.  
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A final aspect of special variations is their net effect on aggregate increases in rates in 
NSW local government through time. Figure 2 compares the long-term trends in the rate-
peg with actual outcomes after special variations had been approved.  
 
Figure 2: Growth in Actual Rates Relative to Pegged Rates, 1995/96 to 2003/04 
0
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NSW Pegged Rates NSW Actual Rates  
Source: Amended Figure 9.7, Allan Report (2006, Figure 9.7, p.208) 
 
The data contained in Figure 2 demonstrate that the impact of special variations on actual 
outcomes is minor; the observed final growth of rates diverges minimally from the rate-
pegged trend line. Allan et al (2006: 207) drew the same general conclusion: ‘additional 
revenue allowed’ as a consequence of the special variation system has ‘not been large as 
a proportion of the total increase in the rate peg limit’.  
 
5. Suggested Improvements to NSW Rate-Setting 
Over the years there has been no shortage of suggestions on how to improve the 
operation of rate-setting in NSW. For example, a Rate Pegging Taskforce, established by 
the NSW Local Government and Shires Associations in 2001, called for a ‘compromise’ 
two-tiered rate-pegging system (Centennial Consultancy, 2004). Tier 1 would employ an 
annually determined index of local government costs, which would apply to all NSW 
councils, which would accurately reflect the real costs impinging on local councils much 
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more precisely than the CPI used at present. Tier 2 would replace the current special 
variation system with a method that took the circumstances of individual councils into 
account and allow councils to make their own variations above Tier 1 levels up to some 
stipulated maximum.  
 
Allan et al (2006: 210) also presented a ‘compromise’ proposal to revise the rate-pegging 
system. This Report argued that ‘the view of this Inquiry is that the peg should be made 
less discretionary (i.e. not subject to Ministerial fiat), be based on explicit criteria (e.g. 
local government unit costs), and be made more transparent (i.e. be published in full). 
Moreover, ‘any variations to the peg with respect to a particular council should be more 
fully disclosed and explained in terms of rational criteria that are applied consistently 
across all councils and not subject to capricious change’.  
 
At a more general level, in its Revenue Framework for Local Government, IPART (2008: 
63-65) presented five alternative regulatory frameworks that could replace the current 
rate-pegging system. A detailed evaluation of these options falls outside the scope of this 
paper and would require empirical simulation exercises using ‘realistic’ data on 
particular types of local authorities to try to model their characteristics and impact of the 
alternative regulatory frameworks.  However, it is nonetheless worth briefly outlining 
these possibilities. Option 1 would retain existing rate-pegging arrangements, but publish 
the economic basis for the peg, modify the special variations process, and leave all other 
charges unregulated. Option 2 would develop a more ‘disaggregated form of rate-
pegging’ using specific pegs for specific categories of council. Option 3 would ‘reduce 
the scope of rate-pegging to cover only local government revenue needed to fund 
operating expenditure’, thereby excluding capital expenditure and all other charges 
unregulated. Option 4 would retain rate-pegging but exempt individual councils, 
provided they could demonstrate financial prudence and operational efficiency in various 
stipulated ways. Finally, Option 5 would remove mandatory rate-pegging and 
simultaneously ‘enhance accountability to the local community’ using several criteria 
and the threat of a ‘default rate cap’.  
 
A detailed analysis of the characteristics of these five options has been conducted by the 
NSW Treasury (2008). It has also suggested several additional feasible approaches to 
NSW council rates regulation. Amongst all these alternative regulatory methods, the 
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NSW Treasury (2008: 27) argued that the objectives of the current NSW rate-pegging 
regime could best be achieved at the least cost by retaining the existing rate-pegging 
system, but with ‘improved criteria’.  
 
Given the historical reluctance of the NSW state governments to make significant 
changes to the rate-pegging system, and the current NSW Government’s new 
‘minimalist’ modifications to the rate-pegging process, it would seem that these 
suggested reforms will remain hypothetical.  
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Against the background of the IPART (2009) Review of the Revenue Framework for 
Local Government, this paper has considered the nature of rate-pegging, the arguments 
surrounding its desirability, and its economic effects on NSW local government. We 
have seen that the case for rate-pegging seems to hinge only on three convincing 
arguments. In the first place, as we have demonstrated in this paper, rate-pegging has 
achieved its basic objective of slowing increases in NSW council rates over time relative 
to other Australian jurisdictions (Allan et al 2006). Secondly, a prima facie case exists 
which suggests that the constraints imposed on council revenue by rate-pegging may 
have enhanced the administrative efficiency of NSW councils and reduced their 
overheads, at least in comparison with the NSW state government departments (Allan et 
al 2006). Finally, rate-pegging has enjoyed ongoing and strong public support (IRIS 
Research 2005), which appears to demonstrate the operation of an efficient ‘political 
market’ in NSW (Dollery, Crase and Byrnes 2006: 397) in the Wittman (1995) sense.  
 
By contrast, several cogent arguments have been advanced against rate-pegging. Firstly, 
it has depressed the rating effort by NSW councils more than it intended since it has had 
a broader ‘dampening’ impact on rates in particular and local government finance more 
generally due to the limited use of the special variation option. Secondly, the existence of 
rate-pegging has partly absolved local councils of full responsibility for their own 
financial affairs, with numerous deleterious consequences, not least a lack of long-term 
planning, which is an essential part of the new IPR framework within which NSW local 
government must operate from the fiscal year 2010/11 onwards. Finally, rate-pegging 
has undermined the democratic bedrocks of ‘local voice’ and ‘local choice’ in local 
government and thereby reduced local autonomy. 
 DOLLERY & WIJEWEERA: Rate-pegging in New South Wales
 
 
CJLG July 2010  75
 
 
The reluctance of the NSW Government to both release the Final Report of Review of the 
Revenue Framework for Local Government and to formally respond to its 
recommendations, as well as its recent decision to retain rate-pegging but shift the 
process to IPART, suggests that, despite the announcement by (former) NSW Premier 
Rees that the NSW government had considered the abolition of rate-pegging, rate-
pegging seems set to continue in NSW, albeit in a slightly amended form. Moreover, its 
continuing popularity seems to indicate that, at best, marginal efforts will be made to 
improve the operation of rate-pegging and thereby at least ameliorate some of its harmful 
effects, rather than abolish it. 
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